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Non-technical summary
Many conflicts in international climate change negotiations are linked to the
question of how to allocate the burden associated with a substantial reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. These distributional aspects arise on several levels:
globally, regionally (e.g. within the European Union) and nationally. As the re-
view of equity rules exhibits, the range of principles and preferences that can be
applied is wide. With respect to the self-interest of nations it is therefore no sur-
prise that international agreements are difficult to attain.
Tradable pollution permits could be one attempt to address equity aspects wi-
thout affecting economic efficiency: As theoretical contributions show, the
equity rule applied to the initial allocation of permits is independent of the effi-
cient, i.e. cost-minimzing realization of the emission reduction target as the lat-
ter is ensured by the international trade of permits. Nevertheless, our empirical
analysis of the burden sharing issue within the European Union (EU) indicates
that the equity rule applied plays an important role for the potential impacts (i.e.
costs), even though both aspects are treated separately.1
The ability-to-pay rule, which favours the poorer and puts the richer countries at
a disadvantage, implies higher overall welfare costs for the EU than the so-
vereignty rule, where permits are grandfathered with respect to a uniform re-
duction rate. Certainly, this effect is linked to the weights given to the country-
specific welfare. For the computations no inequality aversion is applied, i.e.
weights are uniform. On the other hand, the analysis of national impacts gives
two insights that are not biased by this kind of evaluation: First, if big countries
(i.e. countries that are powerful in terms of economic activity) are affected con-
siderably, the interconnection of countries through bilateral trade might make
the underlying burden sharing rule less attractive even for those countries which
are favoured by the particular equity rule in terms of the initial allocation. And
second, the recycling of the surplus of permits emerging for some countries in
the ability-to-pay allocation has crucial impacts on consumer welfare. Using the
revenues from selling this surplus on the international market to reduce public
deficit leaves the rest of the economy more or less untouched and therefore gi-
ves no positive signal to welfare.
With respect to economic and environmental welfare, the sovereignty rule
seems to be the most acceptable for an implementation of an EU-wide permit
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 The simulations and their assessment are based on the GEM-E3 model, a multi-country and
multi-sectoral general equilibrium model framework for the European member states.
system. All countries show a positive welfare effect and the overall EU benefit
is greater than under egalitarianism and ability-to-pay.
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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to present different equity rules that can be
applied to the initial allocation of greenhouse gas entitlements and to analyse
the potential impacts of these rules EU-wide as well as on the level of member
states. The methodological framework used in the empirical part of the paper is
based on the GEM-E3 model, a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable
general equilibrium model for fourteen EU-member states. The major finding of
the paper is that being ex ante favoured with respect to the initial allocation of
permits might not hold ex post, i.e. when trade of permits and actual emission
reductions are carried out. The reason can be found in two effects. First, the in-
terdependence of the EU economies allows smaller economies not to make full
use of the advantages they get through the ability-to-pay allocation: The negati-
ve impact on the economic perfomance of the big economies leads to a drop of
export demand in the smaller economies, which in turn lowers the expected po-
sitive impact on welfare in the latter ones. Second, the way of how a surplus of
permits in a particular country is used has considerable impacts on consumer
welfare. Selling the surplus of permits on the international market and use the
receipts to reduce public deficit is one way, but it has no direct impact on de-
mand. Other, more demand stimulating recycling strategies of the surplus (e.g. a
lump-sum transfer to households) might be more promising if welfare losses are
to be minimzed. Both effects may outweigh the positive effect realized ex ante
in some countries due to a more ’fair’ initial allocation of permits. The outcome
emphasizes the importance of a consideration of full general equilibrium effects
across countries.
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11 Introduction
The recent developments in climate change policy reveal once more the im-
portance of the burden sharing issue in fleshing out an internationally binding
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The heterogeneity of interests
involved stems from national and/or sectoral differences in wealth, the current
stage of development, the energy intensity of production and/or consumption,
the resource allocation, and so on. The debate on how to allocate the burden
entailed by climate protection revolves around international and regional com-
mitment efforts. For the climate change policy of the European Union (EU) this
issue arises on both levels. At the Kyoto Conference in December 1997, the EU
as a whole voted for a 15% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in industria-
lized countries to be reached in 2010.2 This decision was preceded by delibera-
tions about the EU-internal allocation of burdens. Considering the standstill on
the international level, the EU-internal consensus is exceptional as even the
burden sharing issue was solved at least for the first 10%.3
On both levels, regionally and internationally, pollution permits are often consi-
dered to be the most appropriate policy instrument for an efficient implementa-
tion of reduction targets for global pollutants. While the international trade of
pollution permits equalizes marginal costs of emission reduction across coun-
tries and, therefore, provides an efficient solution, the initial allocation of per-
mits enables various opportunities to tackle the equity aspect.
This paper deals with both efficiency and equity, whereas the main emphasis
lies on the latter. The objective is to review and analyse the potential impacts of
different equity rules applied to the EU-internal burden sharing.
The first part of the paper (Sections 2 and 3) gathers and discusses the principle
concepts and alternatives of the equity issue from a methodological point of
view and refers to the initial allocation of pollution rights in particular. The se-
cond part of the paper applies a selection of equity rules to a given EU reduc-
tion target (10% reduction of CO2 by 2010 based on 1990 emissions) (Section
4) and assesses the potential impacts with respect to welfare and other macro-
economic aggregates on both EU-wide and national levels (Section 5). All si-
mulations are undertaken with the computable general equilibrium model GEM-
E3. The final section (Section 6) draws some conclusions.
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 Finally, the EU agreed on an 8% reduction to be realized between the years 2008 to 2012.
3
 See EC(1997) for the country specific obligations the Council of Ministers has agreed on.
22 Equity and efficiency
An effective protection of global common goods requires an international
agreement whereby countries commit themselves to emission reductions on a
more or less voluntary basis. As countries will not be willing to cooperate if
they feel that the international sharing of economic costs of the global warming
policy is unfair, international agreements should be based on equity criteria that
are accepted by all negotiators. In general, international equity issues arise in
view of substantial differences between countries, e.g. in terms of population,
wealth and consumption, purchasing power, emissions of greenhouse gases in
the past, present and future, or vulnerability to climate change (Banuri et al.
1996, p. 91). The choice of the equity rule has significant consequences for the
distribution of the costs of environmental protection amongst countries.
No political consensus on who should pay for abatement of CO2 at the interna-
tional level has been developed yet. As equity issues are not a topic of economic
theory, equity principles have to be based on ethical and normative judgements.
However, studying the potential impacts of different burden sharing mecha-
nisms might give some insights that could contribute significantly to reach an
international consensus.
As long as the theoretical conditions for an efficient allocation prevail, econo-
mic efficiency, defined in terms of Pareto-optimality, is neutral with respect to
distributional issues. The economically efficient allocation of emission reduc-
tions is independent of how the total costs of these reductions are shared bet-
ween countries, or which equity rule is applied. Empirical analysis supports the
theoretical finding of the independency of the Pareto-optimal emissions trajec-
tory from the initial allocation of emission rights.
Manne and Richels (1995, p. 23), for instance, note that "the rules for the allo-
cation of emission rights imply that there will be wealth transfers, but empiri-
cally we have found that the general equilibrium effects of these transfers are
too small to influence the overall level of emissions. In this sense, our results
are consistent with the Coase Theorem - the proposition that wealth transfer ef-
fects are too small to influence the Pareto-optimal level of provision of a public
good (the mean global temperature)".
Conflicts between efficiency and equity principles in global warming policy
arise only in the absence of international lump-sum transfers. According to Tin-
bergen (1952, pp. 27ff.), each policy that is supposed to address both efficiency
and equity needs two policy instruments: one instrument for dealing with allo-
cative objectives, e.g. a tax or permit system, and a second for implementing
equity issues, e.g. compensation payments or transfers. In this sense, transfers
3are not only interpreted as financial transfers, e.g. redistribution of tax revenues,
but can also be in terms of an initial free-of-charge allocation of emission per-
mits.
According to this, the IPCC report (Banuri et al. 1996) makes a distinction bet-
ween proposals for distributing abatement costs including international transfers
and proposals for fair distribution of emissions separated from any substantive
financial transfers.
Under a non-cooperative approach without compensation payments, the initial
distribution of emission constraints determines simultaneously both the alloca-
tion of emission reductions as well as the distribution of costs. Given the as-
sumption that the international authority has full information concerning natio-
nal abatement cost functions, a cost-efficient international allocation of emis-
sion reductions can be implemented. But even if efficiency of resource allocati-
on is ensured, the resulting distribution of burden sharing might be perceived as
unfair as it "does not address the tendency toward national self-interest, the abi-
lity of nations to pay the cost, or international political balance" (Rose 1990, p.
927). On the other hand, an equitable allocation of emission constraints is very
likely to be inefficient from a global point of view.
Under a cooperative approach, an overall emission reduction target, which is
defined for the whole group of the contractual partners, is implemented by a
common economic instrument, such as an international CO2 tax or an interna-
tional tradable permit system. Here, efficiency and equity aspects can be
addressed seperately and treated as complementary principles. Whereas the al-
location/price mechanism of the economic instrument leads to an efficient allo-
cation of emission reductions, equity concepts are used to determine how the
tax revenue is distributed or how the permits are allocated initially across coun-
tries.
Even if the literature provides different classifications of principles for burden
sharing, the "examination of international equity issues is still in its infancy"
(Banuri et al. 1996, p. 85). Banuri et al. (1996, p. 104), for example, distinguish
between procedural and consequentalist equity; the first has to do with partici-
pation, process and treatment before the law, the second refers to the outcome
of decisions, i.e. the distribution of burdens and benefits. The latter is split in
five categories: parity (all claimants receive equal shares of burdens or bene-
fits), proportionality (distribution of burdens or benefits in proportion to the
contributions of claimants), priority (those with the greatest needs should be put
first), classical utilitarism (distribution in order to achieve the greatest good for
the greatest number), and Rawlsian distributive justice (equal distribution un-
less an unequal distribution operates to the benefit of the least advantaged).
4In the following, different mechanisms for burden sharing, mainly provided by
Rose and Stevens (1996), and Rose (1990), are presented and discussed regard-
ing their implications for the international distribution of costs and benefits of
global warming policy. Table 1 summarizes the criteria and translates them into
operational rules for global warming policy in general and tradable permits in
particular. Keeping in mind that economic efficiency and equity issues can be
separated in economic theory, the listed principles of burden sharing can also be
used to determine reimbursement rules in the case of a CO2 tax.
First of all, Rose and Stevens classify the equity criteria according to whether
they are defined in terms of the initial allocation of emission rights (’allocation-
based’) or in terms of traditional welfare economics (’outcome-based’).
Allocation-based rules are related directly to the distribution of emission rights
or to the distribution of gross abatement costs. Within a model framework, allo-
cation-based rules are reflected by each country’s initial endowment of emission
rights according to the applied equity criterion. The distribution of emission
rights may represent an initial stock of tradable permits in case of a cooperative
implementation of the global reduction target (i.e. subsequent trading of permits
between countries is allowed) or the final allocation of national emission levels
in case of a non-cooperative solution (i.e. countries implement given reduction
targets independently).
In contrast to allocation-based rules, outcome-based rules take into account the
incidence of costs and benefits, i.e. the net welfare change due to global warm-
ing policy. Outcome-based rules are defined in terms of the relation of net wel-
fare to sub-criteria such as GDP or GDP per capita. Modelling this rule is more
complex as for each country one has to set the net welfare level, the equity rule
being simulated demands. Then, the model is solved either for the correspon-
ding initial permit allocation, taking into account the international trading of
emission permits (in case of a cooperative implementation of the global reduc-
tion target), or for the corresponding final allocation of national emission levels
(in case of a non-cooperative implementation of the global reduction target).
5Table 1: International equity criteria for sharing the costs and benefits of a global warming policy
Criterion Basic Definition General Operational Rule Operational Rule for CO -Permits
outcome-based equity criteria
Horizontal All nations should be treated equally Equalize net welfare change across nations (net cost of
abatement as proportion of GDP equal for each nation)*
Distribute permits to equalize net welfare
change (net cost of abatement as proportion
of GDP equal for each nation)*
Vertical Welfare changes should vary inversely
with national economic well-being
Progressively share net welfare change across nations
(net cost proportions inversely correlated with per capita
GDP)*
Progressively distribute permits (net cost
proportions inversely correlated with per
capita GDP)*
Compensation No nation should be made worse off Compensate net losing nations Distribute permits so that no nation suffers a
net loss of welfare
Rawls’s Maxi-
min
Maximization of the welfare of the
worst-off nations
Maximize the net benefit to the poorest nations Distribute largest proportion of net welfare
change to poorest nations
allocation-based equity criteria
Ability to Pay Mitigation costs should vary inversely
with national economic well-being
Equalize abatement costs across nations (gross abate-
ment costs as proportion of GDP equal for each unit)**
Distribute permits to equalize abatement
costs (gross costs of abatement as propor-
tion of GDP equal for each nation)**
Egalitarian All people have an equal right to pollute
and to be protected from pollution
Equalize per capita emissions across countries (in con-
temporary or historical form)
Distribute permits in proportion to popula-
tion or historical responsibilities
Sovereignty All nations have an equal right to pollute
and to be protected from pollution
Allocation of emission reductions in a proportional man-
ner across all nations, i.e. equal percentage emission
reductions
Distribute permits in proportion to emissi-
ons
Market Justice The market is fair Make greater use of markets Distribute permits to highest bidder
Consensus The international negotiation process is
fair
Seek a political solution promoting stability Distribute permits in a manner that satisfies
the (power weighted) majority of nations
* Net costs equal to the sum of: mitigation benefits - abatement costs + permit sales revenues - permit purchase costs.
** Gross cost refers to abatement costs only.
Source: Rose and Stevens (1996, p. 3), modified.
63 Operationalisation of equity rules
3.1 Outcome-based equity criteria
Horizontal equity calls for an equal treatment of all nations in terms of welfare
outcome. Rose and Stevens (1996, p. 11) distinguish two different operational
versions of the horizontal equity concept:
• The share of net welfare to GDP is equalized across nations. This implies that
countries with a relatively larger share of global GDP receive a relatively
greater share of global net welfare.
• The share of net welfare to population is equalized across countries. Conse-
quently, the largest share of global net benefits is distributed to those coun-
tries with the largest share of global population.
A third operational rule of horizontal equity can be defined as follows:
• The share of net welfare to GDP per capita is equalized. This implies that
countries with a relatively larger share of global GDP per capita receive a
relatively greater share of global net welfare.
According to the vertical equity rule, the abatement costs of a global warming
policy are progressively shared across countries. This means, the country’s net
welfare is inversely related to the GDP. Countries with a relatively lower GDP
(and thus, as a rule, with lower CO2 emissions) receive a relatively bigger share
of global net benefit (i.e. have to bear relatively less costs) than countries with a
relatively higher GDP. Thus, "vertical equity expresses greater concern for the
disadvantaged" (Rose 1990, p. 930). Examples for vertical equity at the inter-
personal level are progressive income taxes.
The compensation criterion is based on the concept of Pareto-optimality. This
allows a policy to be introduced only if no individual or group of individuals is
worse off. The net losers have to be compensated by the net winners, so that no
country suffers a negative net benefit. The concrete design of the compensation
scheme requires the application of other equity criteria such as the horizontal or
vertical equity principle.
Furthermore, there are two additional outcome-based equity concepts, the basic
needs approach and the Rawlsian Maximin rule (see Banuri et al. 1996, p. 104).
The basic needs approach grants countries the right to emit the minimum levels
of greenhouse gases that safeguard the meeting of their citizen’s basic needs.
Basic needs can be defined as minimum consumption levels needed to support
7full participation in society, depending on regional characteristics such as
climate. The basic needs approach can be seen in relation to the Rawlsian ap-
proach. Taking over the Rawlsian concept of intergenerational equity on an in-
ternational context, the Rawlsian Maximin rule says that "the welfare of the
worst-off individual is to be maximized before all others" (Rose 1990, p. 931).
This implies that this equity concept should be used to improve the position of
the
poorest countries. Accordingly, Rose and Stevens (1996, p. 14) operationalise
this rule by redistributing any positive net benefits for the three industrialized
nations in their sample to the three poorest nations. Ultimately, by giving prefe-
rence to the disadvantaged group, the Rawlsian criterion is closely connected to
the vertical equity principle and the egalitarian rule.
3.2 Allocation-based equity criteria
The ability-to-pay criterion, or more generally spoken, the principle of compa-
rable burdens, is based on the claim that "allocation should affect all countries
similarly or involve ’comparable burdens’ or ’sharing the effort equally’" (Banuri
et al. 1996, p. 105). Several more or less complex, operational rules of this crite-
rion are discussed in the literature (they reach from ’equal monetary abatement
costs’ to more general measures of ability-to-pay). Rose and Stevens (1996)
operationalise this criterion very simply by choosing an initial allocation of
emission rights inversely to the proportions of the GDP.
The egalitarian criterion suggests that all human beings should be entitled to an
equal share of the global atmospheric resource. The egalitarian rule can take
two forms: equal contemporary entitlements and equal historical stock entitle-
ments.
The first implies that the share of emissions to population is equalized, i.e. each
human being should have equal rights in terms of per capita emissions. As
emission rights (e.g. tradable permits or tax revenues) are distributed in propor-
tion to each nation’s current population, countries with per capita emissions be-
low the average will gain an excess entitlement, whereas countries with per ca-
pita emissions above will have a deficit.
The second form takes ’cumulative historical emissions’, i.e. emissions that have
been cumulated over a period of time, as a reference point for per capita entitle-
ments (Rose 1990, p. 929; Krumm 1995, p. 46; Banuri et al. 1996, p. 105). The
second form is based on the principle of historical responsibilities. It takes into
account that greenhouse gas emissions are stock pollutants and that the global
stock, the atmosphere, is finite. From an equity point of view, it might be
reasonable that not the current emissions determine the responsibility for pay-
8ing, but rather the emissions which have been built up by a country in the past.
Actually, there is a broad consensus in the literature that industrialized countries
have made excessive use of their rights to emit CO2 in the past whereas develo-
ping countries are in credit. The principle of historical responsibilities is not
restricted to egalitarianism, but can be used, for instance, to determine cut backs
from current emission levels in direct proportion to historical, cumulative emis-
sions.
The sovereignty criterion "represents the basic rights of national entities, often
focused on territorial integrity" (Rose 1990, p. 930). In the case of climate
change, the sovereignty rule implies equal percentage cuts of current or base
year emissions. According to their baseline emission levels, countries have to
undertake emission reduction measures on a different scale. The sovereignty
rule is closely connected to the proportionality rule, which - as nations are bur-
dened in proportion to their contribution to damage caused - is related to the
polluter-pays principle. The sovereignty rule reflects in some respects the claim
for keeping the ’status quo’ allocation, as it is fully equivalent to an initial allo-
cation of emission rights in proportion to current emissions.
Another ’status quo’ rule suggests allocating emission rights proportionally to
national GDP, i.e. nations with a larger share in global GDP will be better off
than nations with lower shares (Krumm 1995, pp. 44). Those who defend the
’emissions per GDP’ criterion argue that economic activities are necessarily
connected with the emission of pollutants. Thus, an allocation of emission
rights that differs too much from the actual ’status quo’ emission scheme might
limit global production and could lead to significant reductions in global wel-
fare. Obviously, this argument does not hold if an international reallocation of
emission rights is enabled, as the equity rule restricts production of richer
countries not in general but due to financial losses caused by side payments.
Even so, as will be shown later in our empirical part of the paper, by conside-
ring full general equilibrium effects, this argument may have some compelling-
ness.
Following the literature, both criteria, the sovereignty rule and the ’emissions
per GDP’ rule, are discussed rather as starting points in model analysis but not
as serious concepts for international, global burden sharing. Accordingly, Ber-
tram (1996, p. 468) states, that "there is general agreement in the literature that
simply ’grandfathering’ emission quotas on the basis of current emissions, or on
the basis of present GDP, could not provide the basis of a workable internatio-
nal agreement, because it would impose heavy costs on non-OECD countries,
while enabling OECD countries to capture rents from the shortage of atmosphe-
ric carbon storage capacity for which they themselves have been responsible
through high past emissions".
9While this assessment might be true for the scientific literature, it contradicts
what can be found in practical policy. Neither the agreement of the Council of
Ministers of the European Union on how to allocate the Kyoto-targets in green-
house gas emissions between countries nor the national commitments in SO2
reduction stated in the Helsinki-Protocol of the Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution coincide with this general agreement: In both
cases, the total burden is shared closely to sovereignty principles. However, the
application of the sovereignty criterion might be assessed less critically if an
international agreement concerns OECD countries or EU-member states only
where differences in economic development are comparably small.
Under the market justice regime the emissions are allocated initially according
to the ’willingness-to-pay’. In contrast to the burden sharing regimes discussed
above, the initial allocation of permits under this rule would have to be based
rather on auctioning than on grandfathering. Analogously to an international
tax, the international authority, which is responsible for collecting the permit
proceeds, can use an international equity rule to reimburse the revenues to the
countries.
The consensus criterion "arises from the implications that the outcome of the
political or diplomatic process is just" (Rose 1990, p. 930). Rose and Stevens
(1996, p. 16), for example, operationalise this criterion by estimating weights
for distributing the total amount of permits as a linear combination of each
country’s share of global population and its share of global GDP. The underly-
ing principle claims that nations with concentrated economic and political po-
wer should have a greater deal of influence in the decision making process.
3.3 Mixed systems
Apart from single-criterion proposals for a ’fair’ distribution of emissions, a
number of mixed systems have been presented in literature. Combining different
equity rules might support the agreement of all countries to participate. Krumm
(1995, p. 49) proposes a linked system of emissions per historical emissions,
emissions per GDP and emissions per population; Welsch (1993) suggests a
combination of population and current emission factors. Nevertheless, even if
countries agree upon a combination of different criteria, the determination of
the weight factors and their change over time remain a major subject for nego-
tiation.
In practice, a mix of several equity concepts (namely the proportionality, histo-
rical responsibilities and ability-to-pay approach) was chosen in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change. The same is supposed to hold for the burden
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sharing proposal of the EC-Council of Ministers given in March 1997. The fol-
lowing chapter will address this aspect in more detail.
Model simulations indicate that the speed of transition from the status quo
situation to an allocation according to an internationally accepted equity rule,
e.g. equal per capita emission rights, has significant influences on the interna-
tional distribution of costs. Manne and Richels (1995), for example, analyse two
alternative burden sharing rules which differ alone in the speed of transition
from one equity principle to another and compare the impacts. Under the ’stan-
dard’ allocation scheme, carbon rights are initially distributed among regions in
proportion to their 1990 level of emissions (status quo). Gradual changes in
these shares over time lead to a distribution in proportion to 1990 population
levels by 2030 (’quicker’ transition to egalitarian rule). Under the ’status quo’
allocation, the gradual transition to equal per capita emission rights is slowed
down and is realized not before 2200 (’slower’ transition to egalitarian rule).
Under the quicker transition scenario, the burden would fall on the more indu-
strialised regions (OECD and former Soviet Union), whose share in global CO2
emissions fall from 66% in 1990 to 22% in 2030, whereas the less industrialised
countries (China and the rest of the world) would win. However, a slower tran-
sition leads to a preferential treatment of industrialised countries, which would
still allow them to emit 60% of total CO2 emissions in 2030.
4 The burden sharing issue in the EU context
The burden sharing issue of climate change protection arises on the global level
as well as on the regional or national level. This aspect is of particular interest
with respect to the decision of the EU to vote for a 15 per cent reduction of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the industrialised countries by the year
2010 at the Kyoto Conference in December 1997. For the EU this goal is sup-
posed to be reached coordinated according to a political consensus of burden
sharing. In March 1997, the Council of Ministers agreed on an allocation of
10% between the EU-member states. Table 2 shows the national GHG
reductions the Council decided on.
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Table 2: The burden sharing proposal of the Council of Ministers
(based on 1990 emissions, to be realized in 2010)
Allocation of a 
10% reduction in 
the EU
Austria -25
Belgium -10
Denmark -25
Germany -25
Finland 0
France 0
Greece 30
Ireland 15
Italy -7
Luxemburg -30
Netherlands -10
Portugal 40
Sweden 5
Spain 17
United Kingdom -10
EU-15 -10
As the Council announces, this allocation takes into account a wide range of
criteria such as cost-effectiveness, differences in starting points, economic de-
velopment, economic structures or resource bases (EC 1997). The proposal con-
siders expectations about growth and technical progress (in both energy effi-
ciency and productivity). Analysing the potential impacts of this proposal is the-
refore difficult, as the model framework used might be based on other assump-
tions concerning efficiency, growth, and so on.
To enable a comparison of the impacts of alternative equity rules on the EU-
level, the equity rules analysed are kept as simple as possible. Three allocation-
based criteria are evaluated with the GEM-E3 model: sovereignty, ability-to-pay
and the egalitarian principle.
Supposed that a given EU-wide emission target (e.g. 90% of the EU-wide CO2
emissions, normalised to 100) should be realized by an EU-wide permit scheme,
then the figures in the columns of the following Table 3 indicate how many
permits should be allocated to a country under a particular equity rule. The par-
ticular operational criteria used are given in the table as well.
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Table 3: Allocation-based burden sharing in the EU
Sovereignty Consensus Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay
(uniform reduction 
rate)
(Proposal of Council of 
Ministers)
(equal per capita 
emissions)
(inverse GDP per 
capita)
Austria 2.2 1.8 2.2 5.7
Belgium 3.9 3.9 2.9 3.3
Germany 23.9 19.7 17.8 0.1
Denmark 2.3 1.9 1.5 9.9
Finland 1.2 1.3 1.4 12.2
France 14.9 16.4 16.1 0.1
Greece 1.4 2.0 2.9 10.1
Ireland 0.8 1.0 1.0 39.1
Italy 13.6 13.9 16.7 0.1
Netherlands 3.1 3.0 4.2 1.5
Portugal 0.6 0.9 2.9 13.8
Spain 6.8 8.7 11.2 0.5
Sweden 2.9 3.4 2.4 3.6
United Kingdom 22.4 22.1 16.6 0.1
EU-14 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: EUROSTAT(1994), EC(1997), own calculations.
As the table records, the burden-sharing proposal of the Council of Ministers
fits in between the sovereignty and the egalitarian principle with a tendency to
sovereignty. The following analysis, therefore, refrains from this particular con-
sensus rule and emphasises more principal rules like sovereignty, egalitarianism
and ability-to-pay.
Table 4 depicts the equity rule based allocations for a 10% reduction of EU-
wide CO2 emissions in terms of the national CO2 emissions in 1990. The
corresponding figures of the Council of Ministers proposal have been given in
Table 2 already.
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Table 4: Net permit allocation (difference to 1990 emissions in %)
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay
(uniform reduction 
rate)
(equal per capita 
emissions)
(invers GDP per 
capita)
Austria -10.0 -8.1 138.8
Belgium -10.0 -33.5 -23.9
Germany -10.0 -33.0 -99.7
Denmark -10.0 -41.4 287.6
Finland -10.0 5.4 793.9
France -10.0 -2.6 -99.3
Greece -10.0 84.6 542.3
Ireland -10.0 15.9 4275.7
Italy -10.0 10.7 -99.1
Netherlands -10.0 24.8 -56.2
Portugal -10.0 345.8 2019.1
Spain -10.0 48.9 -93.5
Sweden -10.0 -25.1 9.3
United Kingdom -10.0 -33.4 -99.5
EU-14 -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
Source: EUROSTAT(1994), EC(1997), own calculations.
As indicated by Table 4, the amount of permits received differs considerably
with respect to the equity rule chosen. Under the ability-to-pay rule Germany,
France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom would potentially suffer with re-
spect to the initial allocation of permits. These countries would get only a small
amount of permits free-of-charge. Belgium and the Netherlands receive at least
a part of the emission rights they actually would need to maintain their econo-
mic activity. The winners are low-income countries, in particular Ireland and
Portugal. Under the egalitarian principle, the number of countries that contri-
bute to the actual burden of the EU-wide emission target increases. While Aus-
tria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom are
discriminated with respect to the 1990 emissions, the remaining EU countries
obtain more rights than needed on the 1990 basis. The sovereignty criterion gi-
ves the same reduction share to each country, i.e. each nation receives 90% of
the emissions in 1990.
With respect to these allocations, the potential burden of a country (or a sector)
is alleviated or reinforced. If a country gets more permits than it would actually
need, the sale of these permits to other countries makes it better off (all other
things being equal). If a country receives much less than it would actually need
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to keep its economic activity, it is obligated to either buy additional permits
from other countries and/or to reduce its emissions significantly. According to
the equity rules used for the initial allocation of permits, the reallocation
through international trade establishes an international transfer system that fa-
vours some countries and puts others at a disadvantage.
5 Simulation of an EU-wide permit scheme under alterna-
tive equity rules
The emphasis of this study lies on the analysis of the potential impacts of alter-
native equity rules given a particular emission target. It is not intended to con-
tribute to the political discussion of equity and distributional fairness in general.
The analysis approaches the subject from a rather positive way of thinking.
Hence, the issue of concern is: If one would choose a particular initial allo-
cation, what would be the impact for the member states and for the EU as a
whole?
The analysis is based on simulation results obtained with the computable gene-
ral equilibrium model GEM-E3. GEM-E3 is a computable general equilibrium
model that considers the economies of 14 EU-member states (EU-15 except Lu-
xembourg) explicitly. The national country models are linked through bilateral
trade flows. Production is distinguished by 18 sectors or products; a representa-
tive household consumes 13 consumption categories. The economic model is
enlarged by an environmental module that covers emission computation, trans-
boundary air pollution and environmental damage calculation of a set of pol-
lutants including CO2, SO2, NOx, VOC and tropospheric ozone. A more detailed
description of the model structure is given in the Appendix.4
5.1 Definition of policy scenario and instrument
The policy goal imposed throughout the simulations is an EU-wide reduction of
1990 CO2 emissions by 10 per cent in 2010. This reduction will take place by
implementing an EU-wide scheme of tradable permits for CO2 emissions in
2001. The goal is reached gradually (linear) within the following 10 years. The
allocation-based rule refers to the initial allocation of permits.
It is worthwhile to explicitly mention some of the features of the permit market
specified in the model:
                                          
4
 See also Capros et al. (1997a) or Conrad and Schmidt (1997).
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• While international burden sharing uses different equity criteria, grandfather-
ing (sovereignty) is used on the country level throughout all simulations.
Hence, if the amount of permits given to a country covers only x per cent of
the emissions in 1990, all polluters receive permits to this extent only, i.e. x
per cent of their emissions in 1990 (uniform rate of reduction within the
country).
• If a country obtains more permits than it actually requires (i.e. the amount of
permits available exceeds the 1990 emissions), all polluters receive permits
free-of-charge to the extent of their needs (actual emissions). The rest (which
is the total national share minus national emission) remains with the govern-
ment. This amount is supplied and sold at the international permit market.
The receipts are kept by the government to reduce public deficit.
• Irrespective of the initial allocation, all polluters decide on the basis of their
individual costs (marginal costs) whether to abate emissions and sell permits,
to emit to the extent of the permits obtained (and keep them) or to emit more
and buy additional permits. According to this decision, polluters supply or
demand permits at the international market.
• The specification considers opportunity costs of holding permits, i.e. pollu-
ters take into account that even those permits that they have received free-of-
charge by the initial allocation are costly as they could be sold on the market
to other polluters if abatement measures are undertaken. Hence, the decision
in production and consumption does not take into account the rents obtained
due to the free-of-charge allocated permits. The rents a sector receives are
passed on to demand by reducing the output price appropriately. The permit
transactions of households are covered by the energy sectors, i.e. they are
modelled similar to value added taxes with lump-sum refunding.
• In any case, free trade of permits between sectors and countries guarantees a
cost-minimizing implementation of the EU-wide reduction target. The effi-
ciency of the instrument (equalized marginal costs) is (theoretically) not af-
fected by the burden sharing issue.
5.2 Simulation results of alternative allocation rules
The presentation of results starts with a discussion of the EU-wide effects of the
three allocation rules. All simulation results presented hereafter refer to the year
2010, i.e. to the economic and environmental situation when the emission target
is fully implemented.
This target is uniform in all cases: 10% reduction of CO2 in 2010 based on 1990
emissions. The goal is reached by reducing the 10% compared to 1990 plus the
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emission growth that is linked to the economic growth within the period 1990 to
2010. For the EU an emission growth rate of 8% is assumed.5 Hence, the actual
reduction effort that has to be undertaken is 18%.
Table 5 shows the economic impacts of the three allocation principles. In terms
of the EU-wide economic welfare, the sovereignty criterion is preferable. Ex-
pressed in per cent of the GDP, a positive welfare effect of 0.32% is obtained.
The egalitarian rule gives a smaller but still positive effect of 0.17%. The abili-
ty-to-pay allocation reduces EU economic welfare. A loss of 0.50 (as percentage
of the GDP) is indicated. Including the welfare effect that is induced by higher
environmental quality improves the overall welfare effect, but the signs do not
change; the welfare effect of the ability-to-pay allocation remains negative.
Table 5: Macro-economic impacts of alternative burden sharing allocations for
EU-14
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay
Gross domestic product -0.80% -0.73% -0.42%
Employment* -787 -683 85
Private investment -0.18% -0.33% -1.01%
Private consumption -0.10% -0.61% -2.64%
Exports in volume -5.73% -4.37% 0.16%
Imports in volume -0.72% -1.55% -4.54%
Intra trade in the EU -5.74% -4.38% 0.15%
GDP deflator in factor prices 4.14% 2.30% -5.28%
Marginal abatement cost** 230.5 213.9 165.1
Economic welfare*** 0.32% 0.17% -0.50%
Economic and environmental welfare*** 0.49% 0.33% -0.34%
* in thousand employed persons
** in ECU’85/tC (ton of carbon)
*** as percentage of GDP
                                          
5
 Pre-Kyoto Study (Capros et al. 1997b, EIS 1997).
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The impacts on welfare can be explained by changes in the components of
utility, i.e. consumption and leisure. While the allocations under sovereignty
and egalitarianism lead to a decrease in both employment (which is equivalent
to an increase in leisure) and consumption, more work has to be supplied for
less consumption in the ability-to-pay allocation. Hence, utility is decreasing.
The negative impact on the GDP is highest under sovereignty and lowest under
ability-to-pay. The variation in GDP is linked mainly to changes in foreign
trade. The GDP deflator in the EU increases by 4.1% in the sovereignty rule as
all countries are affected in the same way. Due to the price increase, extra-EU
exports are decreasing by more than 5.7%. In contrast, the GDP deflator decrea-
ses in the case of the ability-to-pay allocation. As it will be shown below, this
drop in prices is induced by those countries which are only partly compensated
by the allocation rule, i.e. which are characterized by a high GDP per capita.
The different development in prices explains why the extra-EU exports remain
on a higher level in the ability-to-pay case than in the sovereignty allocation.
Nevertheless, the price increase under the sovereignty rule realizes a reduction
in EU-extra imports as the output effect dominates the substitution effect. This
holds for the egalitarian rule as well.
The permit prices (marginal abatement costs) obtained at the end of the reduc-
tion period vary considerably between allocation rules. The permit price is high-
est under the sovereignty allocation (230 ECU/tC or 63 ECU/tCO2)6 and lowest
under ability-to-pay (165 ECU/tC or 45 ECU/tCO2). The outcome under the
egalitarian regime is almost 214 ECU/tC (or 59 ECU/tCO2). This ranking is
striking, as the welfare effects are inversly related to the permit prices, i.e. a
higher permit price leads to a better outcome in terms of welfare. To explain
this effect, a country-specific analysis has to be undertaken.
Table 6 locates the sources of the EU-wide negative welfare impact in the abi-
lity-to-pay allocation: negatively affected are Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The egalitarian allocation reveals
negative economic welfare effects for Denmark and the United Kingdom, while
applying the sovereignty rule generates positive welfare effects for all countries,
even though the permit price is highest in the latter one. Receiving more permits
under a particular rule is not equivalent to a more positive or less negative im-
pact on welfare. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden would prefer the sov-
ereignty allocation, even though they would receive less permits in the initial
allocation than under ability-to-pay. The reasons for this effect will be made
more obvious later on.
                                          
6
 tC: ton of carbon, tCO2: ton of carbon dioxide.
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The EU-wide emission reduction in 2010 corresponds to the policy target by
definition, as the endogenous permit prices match the exogenous total supply of
permits (90% of 1990 emissions) and the endogenous demand of permits (i.e.
the actual emissions). The actual reduction effort including both the target rela-
ted to 1990 plus the growth of emissions induced by economic growth, lies for
all countries (and allocation rules) within the range of 13% to 23% (based on
the emissions of 1990). The net contribution of countries to the common goal is
usually much lower, depending on the growth that is assumed to take place in
the different countries if no policy would take place.7 The effects of the policy
on emissions of other pollutants are not shown in the table, as the reductions are
nearly stable throughout all three cases: EU-wide the actual reductions account
for nitrooxide (NOx) around 14%, for sulfur dioxide (SO2) around 25%, for vo-
latile organic compounds (VOC) around 9% and for particulates (PM) around
28% of the emissions in 1990.
Table 6: Welfare effect and emission reduction in the EU-member states
Economic welfare* CO2 emissions**
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay Sovereignty Egalitarianism
Ability-to-
pay
Austria 0.62% 0.62% 0.56% -15.60% -14.79% -12.27%
Belgium 0.65% 0.26% 0.39% -3.71% -3.88% -0.91%
Germany 0.36% 0.08% -0.56% -25.73% -25.92% -25.58%
Denmark 0.27% -0.03% 0.34% -6.66% -7.74% -3.42%
Finland 0.18% 0.19% 0.16% 16.81% 17.63% 20.26%
France 0.40% 0.40% -0.36% -9.90% -9.16% -9.34%
Greece 0.10% 0.13% 0.25% 16.83% 17.57% 19.89%
Ireland 1.29% 1.24% 1.00% 4.61% 5.45% 8.03%
Italy 0.26% 0.27% -0.58% 1.36% 2.07% 1.37%
Netherlands 0.18% 0.22% -0.10% 9.38% 10.09% 11.00%
Portugal 0.06% 0.10% 0.22% 38.21% 39.01% 41.34%
Spain 0.38% 0.37% -0.72% 18.99% 19.76% 18.63%
Sweden 0.47% 0.31% 0.43% 14.15% 14.39% 17.18%
United Kingdom 0.17% -0.29% -1.28% -17.23% -18.39% -20.00%
EU-14 0.32% 0.17% -0.50% -10.00% -10.00% -10.00%
* as percent of GDP 
** observed in 2010 based on 1990
Looking at the country-specific development of CO2 emissions and the under-
lying emission reductions gives no clear answer to the welfare changes obtained
under a particular rule. The reduction in Germany, for instance, is almost in-
elastic to the allocation rule, but welfare is highest under sovereignty and lowest
                                          
7
 As mentioned before, the growth assumptions follow the estimates given by the Pre-Kyoto
Study of Capros et al. (1997b).
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(even negative) under ability-to-pay. While Austria or Belgium reduce more
under sovereignty than under ability-to-pay, they realize a lower welfare impact
under the former. For Greece and Portugal this relation is the other way round.
Hence, there is no clear relation between the burden a country obtains and the
actual reduction effort undertaken.
The weakness of this relation is driven by the cost-minimizing behaviour of
firms and households, as the principal decision of reducing emissions or keep-
ing (or buying) permits is not altered by the amount of free-of-charge permits
obtained (opportunity costs, see above). But receiving fewer permits free-of-
charge reduces the ability to use these rents for output price reductions. In this
case, prices remain on high levels. Hence, the less permits a country receives
initially, the more the distortionary impacts of the permit scheme resemble
those of emission taxes. For countries that are affected considerably (i.e. those
who receive little), an international permit scheme might be even worse than a
national emission tax, as the refunds are going abroad in the former, while they
are kept and spent within the country in the latter.
This mechanism explains the situation indicated by the simulation results.
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom receive almost no per-
mits free-of-charge in the ability-to-pay allocation. The Netherlands get less
than 50% of the 1990 emissions. All six countries show a welfare loss as no
compensation due to free-of-charge permits is available. The increase in output
prices leads to a sharp decrease in domestic demand. As Table 7 indicates, pri-
vate consumption falls in particular in those countries which lose in terms of
welfare (from 0.88% in the Netherlands to 5.37% in the United Kingdom). The
same holds for the decrease in investment, which ranges from 0.44% in the
Netherlands to 1.82% in the United Kingdom.
20
Table 7: Impacts on private consumption and private investment
Consumption Priv. Investment
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay Sovereignty Egalitarianism
Ability-to-
pay
Austria 0.64% 0.67% 0.65% -0.30% -0.19% 0.06%
Belgium 0.37% -0.55% -0.08% -0.23% -0.50% -0.15%
Germany -0.13% -1.09% -3.12% -0.25% -0.56% -1.18%
Denmark -0.34% -1.63% 0.16% -0.21% -0.57% 0.09%
Finland -0.24% -0.19% -0.11% -0.21% -0.17% -0.08%
France 0.03% 0.14% -2.46% -0.41% -0.34% -1.00%
Greece -0.24% -0.16% 0.18% 0.18% 0.21% 0.30%
Ireland 1.91% 1.89% 1.56% -0.13% -0.04% 0.14%
Italy -0.26% -0.19% -2.11% -0.16% -0.11% -0.90%
Netherlands -0.23% -0.06% -0.88% -0.18% -0.14% -0.44%
Portugal -0.68% -0.56% -0.18% -0.84% -0.74% -0.40%
Spain 0.05% 0.05% -3.46% -0.12% -0.09% -1.68%
Sweden 0.34% -0.24% 0.58% -0.28% -0.37% 0.09%
United Kingdom -0.33% -1.95% -5.37% 0.25% -0.40% -1.82%
EU-14 -0.10% -0.61% -2.64% -0.18% -0.33% -1.01%
Due to the drop in demand, domestic production for domestically produced
goods and imports fall. Hence, there are two opposite effects on prices in the
disadvantaged countries: The prices increase due to the purchase of permits but
decrease due to the loss in demand. As the deflator of the GDP depicted in
Table 8 indicates, the latter overcompensates the former effect in the welfare
losing countries.
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Table 8: Development of the GDP-deflator
GDP-deflator
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay
Austria 4.68% 4.11% 1.76%
Belgium 5.11% 2.28% 0.11%
Germany 3.94% 0.86% -6.24%
Denmark 4.24% 1.10% 1.56%
Finland 3.49% 2.82% 0.60%
France 4.74% 4.29% -5.45%
Greece 5.28% 4.68% 2.53%
Ireland 6.76% 5.84% 2.46%
Italy 3.97% 3.51% -5.22%
Netherlands 2.01% 1.58% -3.08%
Portugal 1.86% 1.45% -0.50%
Spain 5.51% 4.72% -8.30%
Sweden 5.00% 3.12% 2.00%
United Kingdom 3.51% -0.52% -9.30%
EU-14 4.14% 2.30% -5.28%
The drop in demand in the rich countries under the abilitiy-to-pay rule explains
the differences in permit prices. Compared to the other allocation rules, produc-
tion and domestic demand decrease in these countries due to the higher burden
they have to carry. This loss in economic activity leads to a significant reduc-
tion of CO2-emissions. The output effect in the rich (and big) countries reduces
the emission reduction effort to be reached (directly) by the endogenous permit
price. Hence, even though the emission target is the same for all
allocation rules, the permit price can be lower in the ability-to-pay rule.
The price depression observed under the ability-to-pay allocation in the rich
(and big) countries boosts exports (see Table 9), which alleviates the negative
effect on the GDP in the rich countries to some extent. In comparison to the tra-
de effects of the sovereignty rule (drop of intra-EU trade by 5.74%, see Table
5), the differences in national price levels in the ability-to-pay allocation stimu-
late intra-EU trade (small increase by 0.15%).
Nevertheless, the welfare impact is less positive even in some of those countries
that are favoured by the allocation rule. The reason can be found in two effects:
First, the interdependence of the EU economies allows smaller economies not to
make full use of the advantages they get through the ability-to-pay allocation:
The negative impact on the economic perfomance of the big economies leads to
a drop of export demand in the smaller economies, which in turn lowers the ex-
pected positive impact on welfare in the latter ones. But these spill-overs can
not explain the whole story, as the current account in the smaller economies is
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still higher under ability-to-pay than under sovereignty. Hence, a considerable
part of the negative welfare effect for the supposed winners of the ability-to-pay
allocation traces back to the way how the surplus of permits (i.e. those permits
that are not passed on to the polluting firms but remain to the government) is
used. Selling those permits on the international market and use the receipts to
reduce public deficit is one way, but it has no direct impact on demand. Hence,
production and income are not affected at all, which rules out positive effects on
welfare. Other, more demand stimulating recycling strategies of the surplus (e.g.
a lump-sum transfer to households) might be more promising if welfare losses
are to be minimzed. The analysis of alternative recycling strategies is a topic of
future research.
Table 9: Impacts on foreign trade
Exports Imports
Sovereignty Egalitarianism Ability-to-pay Sovereignty Egalitarianism
Ability-to-
pay
Austria -4.53% -4.21% -3.11% -1.97% -1.75% -1.12%
Belgium -3.70% -3.04% -2.39% -2.23% -2.56% -1.72%
Germany -4.38% -2.43% 2.18% -1.84% -2.40% -3.22%
Denmark -3.86% -2.49% -2.93% -2.76% -3.23% -1.61%
Finland -3.20% -2.93% -2.07% -1.66% -1.46% -0.92%
France -5.22% -5.09% 1.95% -2.23% -1.96% -3.14%
Greece -5.29% -5.04% -4.40% -1.99% -1.79% -1.02%
Ireland -4.71% -4.23% -2.77% -1.73% -1.38% -0.58%
Italy -4.30% -4.14% 1.64% -2.77% -2.53% -3.75%
Netherlands -1.59% -1.54% -0.37% -1.24% -1.04% -1.05%
Portugal -1.46% -1.49% -1.09% -1.83% -1.67% -0.74%
Spain -5.90% -5.53% 4.07% -2.70% -2.53% -5.03%
Sweden -4.86% -3.77% -3.39% -2.57% -2.53% -1.24%
United Kingdom -3.14% -0.73% 4.70% -1.24% -2.23% -4.01%
EU-14 -5.73% -4.37% 0.16% -0.72% -1.55% -4.54%
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6 Conclusion
Allocating the burden between parties is at the focus of interest in the interna-
tional negotiation process on climate protection. As the review of equity rules
exhibits, the range of principles and preferences that can be applied is wide.
With respect to the self-interest of nations it is, therefore, no surprise that inter-
national agreements are difficult to attain. For a comparable homogenous group
of countries like the EU, the choice of the operational rule is less decisive. Ne-
vertheless, the simulations undertaken with an EU-wide tradable permit scheme
indicate that, even within the EU, the burden sharing issue matters. The ability-
to-pay rule, which favours the poorer and puts the richer countries at a disa-
dvantage, implies higher overall welfare costs for the EU than the sovereignty
rule, where permits are grandfathered with respect to a uniform reduction rate.
Certainly, this effect is linked to the weights given to the country-specific wel-
fare. For the above computations no inequality aversion is applied, i.e. weights
are uniform. On the other hand, the analysis of national impacts gives two in-
sights that are not biased by this kind of evaluation: First, if big countries (i.e.
countries that are powerful in terms of economic activity) are affected consider-
ably, the interconnection of countries through bilateral trade might make the
underlying burden sharing rule less attractive even for those countries which are
favoured by the particular equity rule in terms of the initial allocation. And se-
cond, the recycling of the surplus of permits emerging for some countries in the
ability-to-pay allocation has crucial impacts on consumer welfare. Using the
revenues from selling this surplus on the international market to reduce public
deficit leaves the rest of the economy more or less untouched and therefore gi-
ves no positive signal to welfare. This is the case for Austria, Finland, Ireland
and Sweden as these countries would prefer an allocation according to the sov-
ereignty rule, even though they would receive less permits in the initial allocati-
on.
With respect to economic and environmental welfare, the sovereignty rule
seems to be the most acceptable for an implementation of an EU-wide permit
system. All countries show a positive welfare effect and the overall EU benefit
is greater than under egalitarianism and ability-to-pay.
Another, more technical insight of the analysis is linked to the differences in
permit prices observed. As the initial allocation of permits might hit domestic
demand (and therefore production) considerably, emissions drop due to a re-
duction in output. The interaction of prices and volumes generates a much lower
permit price under the ability-to-pay allocation than under sovereignty or egali-
tarianism. Hence, the evaluation of full general equilibrium effects seems to be
crucial for a consistent assessment of alternative equity rules.
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Appendix: Structure of the GEM-E3 model
The following brief description of the model is limited to the analytical specifi-
cation. For data requirements and parameterization of both the economic model
and the environmental module, see Capros et al. (1997a) or Schmidt (1998).
A.1 Production
The technology of a cost minimizing industry is characterized by nested CES
cost functions. Figure A.1 gives an overview of the nesting.
Figure A.1: The nested production and factor price scheme
X
K
(production)
LEM
(capital) (labour, energy, material)
EL LFM
(electricity) (labour, fuels, material)
L MF
(labour) (material)(fuels)
M M1 14.......F F F1 2 3
(coal) (oil) (gas) (non-energy inputs)
Using the dual formulation, the cost function C(X,PK,PLEM,g)  represents 0 the
first stage of the problem of the firm in which output X  is produced given the
input prices for capital, PK , and the labour/energy/material aggregate, PLEM ,
respectively. The price diminishing technical progress g is specified by expo-
nential (exogenous) rates of diminuition. This type of technical change consi-
ders autonomous (costless) energy efficiency improvements.
Profit maximization under constant returns-to-scale (in the long-term) implies
marginal revenues equal to marginal costs, which explains the output price PX
of domestic production in terms of a CES unit cost function:
(1) PX =  PX(PK,PLEM,g)0.
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Applying Shephard’s Lemma yields the factor demand functions for K  (capital)
and LEM  (aggregate labour, energy and materials).
Capital input as derived from (1) is the desired capital stock, say Kdes. In the
GEM-E3 model, however, we treat capital as a quasi-fixed stock over the cur-
rent year at a level from the end of the previous year, say K
-1. Hence, the derived
demand function for K  can be used to determine an endogenous ex post price of
capital based on a rate of return which the industry has earned ex post.
(2) PK PX f X
K
gpost = ⋅




−1
,
PKpost  is the endogenous shadow price of capital which clears the market for
fixed K
−1 . This price is used to calculate capital income PK Kpost ⋅ −1  in period t.8
Given an ex ante price of capital antePK = PI (r + )⋅ δ , the factor demand function
for K  can be employed to determine the desired stock of capital Kdes , 0where
PI  is the price of investment goods, r is the rate of return on risk-free govern-
ment bonds (in the standard version of the model exogenously given) and δ  is
the rate of replacement.
Net investment Inet with ’adjustment’ is given by
(3) net des -1I = m(K - K ) .0
Finally, the capital stock for the next period is
(4) K = I +(1- ) Kbr -1δ ,0
where I I Kbr net= + ⋅ −δ 1   (gross investment).
Next, we specify a CES price function for the aggregate LEM:
(5) PLEM = PLEM(PEL,PLFM,g) ,0
where PEL  is the price of electricity ( EL ) and PLFM  an aggregation of the pri-
ces of labour ( L ), other fuels ( F ) and material ( M ).
One level further down of the nesting the unit cost function for the LFM aggre-
gate has to be specified:
                                          
8
 It is easy to check that our calculation of PKpost  is equivalent to calculating it from the zero
profit condition.
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(6) PLFM = PLFM(PL,PF,PM,g).0
Again, we derive the LFM and EL aggregates as well as the price-dependent
composition of the LFM aggregate from Shephard’s Lemma. This yields the in-
put coefficients for labour, the material aggregate and the fuels aggregate.
The final level is given by a CES-composition of these aggregates. The fuels
aggregate consists of three fuel inputs (1,2,3: solid fuels, liquid fuels, natural
gas), whereas the material aggregate considers fourteen non-energy inputs (5-
18: (agriculture, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products, other ener-
gy intensive industries, electrical goods, transport equipment, other equipment
goods industries, consumer goods industries, building and construction, tele-
communication services, transports, services of credit and insurances, other
market services, non-market services). The fourth sector (4) is the electricity
sector specified already in equation (5).
(7) PF = PF(PY , PY ,PY ,g)1 2 3~ ~ ~ 0
(8) PM = PM(PY ,  ...,PY g)  ,5 18~ ~ , 0
where PYi
~
 denotes the price of domestic supply PYi  plus indirect taxes.9
Again applying Shephard’s Lemma yields the derivation of the input coeffi-
cients. By multiplying the input coefficient of the aggregates by the coefficients
of their sub-inputs, one obtains the overall input coefficients ai with respect to
the domestically produced supply. These input coefficients depend on relative
prices of inputs.
A.2 The foreign trade specification
The Armington approach is applied to the modelling of intra-industry foreign
trade between the EU-member countries: domestically produced goods and im-
ports from different countries are imperfect substitutes. Imposing a CES-
structure for the domestic supply Yc in country c composed by domestic pro-
duction (for domestically demanded goods) XDc  and imports IMc  gives the fol-
lowing unit cost function.10
(9) ( )c x c1- x c 11-PY = c PXD + (1 - c ) PIMX x X⋅ ⋅ −σ σ σ1 ,
                                          
9
 See also equation (9).
10
 Note that XDc is the production for the domestic market only.
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where σx > 0 is the elasticity of substitution, cx  a distribution parameter and
PYc, PXDc, and PIMc are the corresponding prices of Yc, XDc, and IMc (price of
aggregated imports is in national currency of country c). From this cost function
we derive both the share of domestic production (for domestically demanded
goods) and the share of imports in total supply (again by applying Shepard’s
Lemma).
If the model determines total domestic supply, then we have to allocate aggre-
gate import demand, derived from (9), to the 14 (considered) EU-member states
and to the rest of the world (row) who contribute to this aggregate import de-
mand. Thus, considering a specific good, the imports of country c consist of the
exports of the other 13 countries in that good. Therefore, the demands for the 18
goods are also distinguished by place of production. Specifying a CES import
unit cost or price function yields (Shepard’s Lemma) a matrix of bilateral trade
flows IMPc k,  with 14 x 15 import demand functions by good and place of pro-
duction (15 = row), where IMPc c, = 0 .
(10) PIM = c PIMP               c =  ,  ...  ,  c
k=1
1
m k
1-
c k
1
1-
m
m
5
1 14∑ ⋅

, , ,
σ
σ
,
where PIMPc k,  is the price of imports coming from country k in currency of
country c. As there are import taxes and duties ( tdut ), it is
( )PIMP t PEX e ec k c k dut k c c k, , , ,= + ⋅ ⋅1  , where all exchange rates are in national cur-
rency per ECU and PEXk c,  is equal to the price of domestic supply in country k
including subsidies, if applicable, i.e. ( )PXD t PXk k sub k= + ⋅1 , . Given the price in-
dex PIMrow  and the exchange rates erow c, , the fifteen prices PIMc  can be calcula-
ted.
The country specific imports IMPc k,  have to match the export demand by defini-
tion, i.e.
(11) k c c k k
c
EXP =
IMP e
e
,
, ⋅
.
Aggregation yields the export demand in country c .
(12) c c k
k
EXP = EXP
,∑
Without price discrimination on the suppliers’ side, domestically produced
goods are supplied at the same price, no matter what the origin of demand is
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(i.e. domestic demand or exports).11 Hence, the equations (9) to (12) and the
corresponding prices ( )PXD PEX t PXc c c sub c= = + ⋅1 ,  describe the entire system of
foreign trade.
To determine the import demand of the rest of the world (row), we proceed as in
equations (9) and (10) by choosing the index row instead of c. Assuming fixed
world market prices PXrow  and exogenously given output levels of the rest of the
world Xrow , yields the import demand functions of the rest of the world.12
As the nominal exchange rates are assumed to be exogenous, the current ac-
count is not balanced. Depending on the scenario to be simulated, the current
account might increase or decrease and even change the sign.13
A.3 Consumer demand and labour supply
The behaviour of consumers is assumed to perform a two-stage budgeting
procedure: an intertemporal allocation of lifetime wealth endowment between
present and future consumption of goods and leisure, and an intratemporal allo-
cation of total consumption of goods into durable and non-durable goods.
Figure A.2 shows the household’s allocation problem.
Figure A.2: The household allocation scheme
                                          
11
 Another model version incorporates a constant elasticity of transformation (CET). There,
suppliers (i.e. firms) maximize their profits by selling their products to different markets
with different prices (see Schmidt 1998).
12
 One of these world prices serves as the numèraire.
13
 Other model versions with constraints on the current account are available but were not
used for the study presented above.
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The representative household determines an allocation of his resources between
present and future consumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility function
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:14
(13) max ln ln
,C LJ t
-t
c t LJ t
t t
(  +  s ) ( (C - C )+ (LJ - LJ ))∑ 1 0 0β β
s.t. WT = (1+r ) (PC C + PLJ LJ )t -t t t t t∑ ⋅ ⋅ ,
where WT is present value of wealth. Ct is private consumption in volume, C0 its
subsistence level, LJt is leisure (in volume) and LJ0 its subsistence level, s is the
subjective discount rate and r is the nominal interest rate. The price of leisure is
PLJ t t t whss fss hdir nom= − − ⋅ − ⋅( ) ( )1 1 , where thdir is the marginal direct tax rate for la-
bour income and thss and tfss are the contribution rates of employers and em-
ployees to social security. Under myopic expectations and the assumption of
constant and equal growth rates for inflation and the nominal wage rate, the
Fisher relation can be used to reduce the demand functions for consumption and
leisure to the following formulas:15
(14) C = C + s
r PC
(Y + PLJ LJ - PC C - PLJ LJ )
r
c disp0 0 0
1β  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
(15) LJ = LJ + s
r PLJ
(Y + PLJ LJ - PC C - PLJ LJ )
r
LJ disp0 0 0
1β  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
                                          
14
 β C  and β LJ  are normalized so as to sum to one.
15
 See Schmidt (1998) for a complete representation of the derivation.
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where rr  is the real long-term interest rate which is assumed to be constant in
the standard version of the model.16
The last equation is implicit in LJ and has to be solved for LJ. Labour supply is
given by the remaining time resources, i.e. total time resources minus leisure
demand. In the standard neo-classical version of the model, the wage rate serves
to match labour demand of firms and leisure demand of households.
The savings of households can then be determined by S=Ydisp - PC ⋅ C.
Two types of consumption expenditure are distinguished: the expenditure for
non-linked, non-durable goods ( e ), which is allocated on the second stage of
the consumer decision problem and the expenditure for the use of durables (this
covers capital costs and demand for linked non-durables associated with the use
of durables). Demand for linked non-durables and demand for services from
durables have to be reconciled with investment demand for modifying the
stocks of durables towards their optimal levels. We, therefore, employ a re-
stricted expenditure function with stocks of durables as quasi-fixed goods. The
expenditure function is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function, which
underlies the linear expenditure system.
(16) e e( p ,  .. . , p ; u; Z , Z ) = p Q +u (Z - Z ) p1 m 1 2
i=1
m
i o,i
j=1
j o, j
-
i=1
n
i
i
j
i
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅



∑
2
Π Πγ
β
β ,
where we denote the prices of consumption categories pi  by small letters to in-
dicate that they do not directly match prices of products PYl~ . The variable u is
the utility level, Q0,i is the minimum required quantity of good i, Z0,j is the mi-
nimum required quantity of a durable good j, and p Qi i⋅∑ 0,  is ’subsistence ex-
penditure’. The expenditure minimizing demand for non-durable goods, given
utility u and the stocks of the durables, can be derived by partial differentiation
of the expenditure function pertaining to the prices:
(17) i ,i i
i i=1
m
i iQ = Q + p e - p Q ,    i =  1,...,m0 0
β ∑ ⋅

, .
The desired stocks of durables and the ex post service prices of durables can be
derived in an analogous way as used for the restricted cost function approach.
With an exogenous ex ante user cost of durables jZp , the desired stock follows
from
                                          
16
 The long-term interest rate is endogenised if the constraint of a balanced current account is
imposed (other version of the model).
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∂ ⋅
∂
e(  , Z )
Z
= - p ,           i.e.j
j
Z j
~
(18) j , j j
Z i=1
m
i ,iZ = Z + p
e - p Q
j
~
0 0
γ ∑ ⋅

 .
Purchases of new durables under partial adjustment restrictions (0< ~mj ≤1) are:
(19) jZnet j j -1, jI = m (Z - Z )~ ~⋅ .
We finally obtain the total consumer expenditures PCE CE⋅  including both non-
durables and the services from durables:
(20) PCE CE = p Q + p ( Z + I )
i=1
m
i i
j=1
3
Z -1, j Z
net
j j
⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑ ∑ .
As some non-durable goods such as fuels and power are linked to the stock of
durables, we use a composition of these goods into a linked part and into a dis-
posable part. The idea behind such a composition is that demand for gasoline
( QG ) is linked to the use of the stock of automobiles (Z). Or, in algebraic terms,
Q = Z + QG G Z Gα ,
~
⋅ , where α G Z,  is yearly gasoline consumption per unit of purcha-
se price of the car and GQ
~
 is gasoline consumption from fast driving or bad
maintenance of the car.17 The latter is considered to be a part of the non-linked
non-durables and is therefore not further specified. The user concept for dura-
bles implies a cost price pZ of the services of, for example, an automobile which
includes the user cost of capital ( ( )PI r + δ ) plus the cost of gasoline, i.e.
Z G Z Gp = PI(r + )+ p~ ,δ α ⋅ . The introduction of a tax on CO2 or NOx will increase
the price of gasoline. Hence, the user cost of an already purchased car will in-
crease while the demand for new cars will decline.
For a guess-estimation of the parameters Q i0, , βi and γj, we make use of the pro-
perties of a linear expenditure system. From guess-estimates of n income elasti-
cities one obtains the n parameters βi and from guess-estimates of n direct price
elasticities one obtains the n parameters Q i0, , given the βi’s (and similarly for the
parameters of the durables).
                                          
17
 For more details see Conrad and Schröder (1991).
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A.4 Demand, supply and model closure
Since our demand system determines consumption goods by categories and our
system of investment functions determines investment demand by destination,
transition matrices are required to transform demand into deliveries from the
industries. Therefore, the final demand has to be seen as the result of the transi-
tion matrix of the type (branches x categories) multiplied by the consumption
categories. Similar to the matching of consumption categories to products, an
investment matrix with fixed technical coefficients serves to compute invest-
ment demand by origin (products) from investment demand by destination
(branches) as evaluated from the investment behaviour in (5) and (6), together
with investment for replacement and decay, i.e. δ ⋅
−
K 1 .
The national accounting identity which expresses that the private gross dome-
stic production from both the flow of cost approach and the flow of product ap-
proach should be equal, is satisfied if and only if total saving, involving income
distribution and fiscal policy relationships, equals total investment. Following
Walras’ Law, this market (n+1) is in equilibrium if an equilibrium price vector
has been found for the other n markets (supposing that the demand, supply and
price functions are specified according to the needs of an Arrow-Debreu eco-
nomy). Therefore, the saving-investment identity (I=S) and the corresponding
global shadow price of capital (mobility of (new) capital between sectors but
not across countries is assumed) is automatically given.
A.5 The environmental module in GEM-E3
The scope of the environmental issue considered is limited to the primary pol-
lutants nitrooxides (NOX), sulfur dioxide (SO2), volatile organic compounds
(VOC), particulates (PM10) and carbon dioxide (CO2), and the secondary pol-
lutants ozone (O3), sulphur (S) and nitrates (N). These emissions are calculated
in linear relation to the use of primary energy inputs, i.e. solid fuels, liquid fuels
and natural gas. The consideration of transboundary air pollution and the com-
putation of secondary pollutants yields concentration and/or deposition figures
per pollutant and country. These figures serve as input of the evaluation of da-
mages, which in turn are used for an integrated ex post assessment of a particu-
lar policy.
For SO2, NOX and VOC, end-of-pipe abatement cost functions ( )c aab  are speci-
fied explicitly. Policy induced abatement measures (i.e. the degree of abatement
a ) but also emission/energy pricing through taxes increase the cost price of
using pollution-intensive inputs. This changes price relations and the derived
demand for intermediates and final consumption. To include these aspects, we
rewrite the price of pollution-intensive inputs:
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(21) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )PFU t PY c ec a c a a c a efi s i s i sen i i s p s p sef p s p s p sab p s p i s i s
p
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
= + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑1 1χ µ ,
where
cs
en : tax on energy,
eci : coefficient for energy content of energy input i (equal across sectors),
χ i s, : share of energy related use of input i  in sector s ,
efp i s, , : emission factor for pollutant p  using input i  in sector s ,
 efp i s, , = 0 for i ≠emission causing energy input,
µ i s, : share of energetic use of demand of input i  in sector s ,
α i s sX, ⋅ : intermediate demand of input i  for output Xs  in sector s .
A similar specification is used for the price of linked non-durable goods in pri-
vate consumption. Inserting these prices in equation (7) or the user cost of dura-
bles and maximizing profits or utility yields both the policy-induced
changes in (intermediate or final) demand and the optimal degree of end-of-pipe
abatement.18 The sectoral expenditures for end-of-pipe abatement is split in de-
mand addressed to delivery sectors through fixed coefficients. These inputs are
added to intermediate demand of the sector and are priced as all other interme-
diate deliveries.
A.6 Welfare measure
The welfare change used for the evaluation of policy scenarios is represented by
Hicks’ measure of equivalent income variation (EV). The EV is based on the
intertemporal utility maximization problem and has to be derived from equati-
ons (13) - (15). In a single period t we have
(22) t t t t t t tEV = FE(PC ,PLJ ,U ) - FE (PC ,PLJ ,U )0 0 1 0 0 0 ,
where FE is the expenditure function corresponding to (13) - (15). Ut1  and Ut0
indicate the utility levels observed in the policy (1) and the reference (0) scena-
rios. EV gives the change in expenditure at base case prices PC0 and PLJ0 that
would be equivalent to the policy-implied change in utility. In order to derive
the expenditure function from the utility function, we insert the demand functi-
ons (14) and (15) into the utility function (13), and solve for the level of utility,
say Ut:
                                          
18
 For further details see Schmidt (1998).
35
(23) t
c
c
t r
LJ
LJ
t r
t t tU =
PC
s
r PLJ
s
r
(FE - PC C - PLJ LJ )β ββ β⋅ ⋅  + ⋅ ⋅  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ln ln ln 0 0 ,
where FEt  is total expenditure, i.e. t disp,t t tFE = Y + PLJ LJ⋅ .
Solving equation (23) for FEt gives the expenditure function used in (22) to de-
termine EV:
t t t t t
-
c
t
-
LJ
t r
t tFE (PC ,PLJ ,U ) = U
PC PLJ
s
r
PC C + PLJ LJ
c LJ
exp ln− 

 ⋅



 ⋅















 + ⋅ ⋅
β ββ β
0 0 .
The utility level Ut  is calculated from the tth element of the sum of utilities in
(13). To aggregate the stream of welfare gains (or losses) of the entire time ho-
rizon, a present value operator is applied. The overall welfare effect of the po-
licy is then
( ) ( )EV s e e PCPC PLJPLJTOT t U U t tt
T
t t t t
C LJ
=
+
⋅ − ⋅



 ⋅




− −
=
∑ 11
1 0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
η η
β β
,
where ηt0  is a function of some reference run data.19
If EV TOT <0, welfare after the policy measure is lower than in the reference case.
The consumer would be willing to pay the maximum amount EV TOT  at the fixed
budget level FE0  to avoid the decline of utility. Similarly, if EV>0, the consu-
mer would be willing to pay up to EV TOT  to see the policy implemented.
                                          
19
 See Schmidt (1998) for a complete representation of the derivation.
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